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Abstract:
McMahan’s own example of a symmetrical defense case, namely his tactical bomber example, opens the door wide open for soldiers to defend their fellow-citizens (on grounds of their special obligations towards them) even if as part of this defense they target non-liable soldiers. So the soldiers on both sides would be permitted to kill each other and, given how McMahan defines “justification,” they would also be justified in doing so and hence not be liable. Thus, we arrive, against McMahan’s intentions, at a moral equality of combatants. In addition, his own account of liability cannot deal adequately with symmetrical defense cases in the first place. This undermines his presupposition that justification defeats liability, which is central to his defense of the moral inequality of combatants. I shall argue that McMahan’s attempts to counter these objections fail and that therefore his general claim of the moral inequality of combatants remains unpersuasive.
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On the dominant position in the just war tradition, from (at least) Aquinas to Grotius and, even further, to Anscombe and Jeff McMahan, there exists a moral inequality of combatants. That is, on the traditional view those combatants participating in a justified war may kill their enemy combatants participating in an unjustified war – but not vice versa.​[1]​
The claim that this view is the dominant one might surprise many readers who have become accustomed to associating Michael Walzer’s thesis of the moral equality of combatants with “the orthodox view.” However, the talk of “the orthodox view” has been introduced by Jeff McMahan himself, and for no good reason.​[2]​ After all, the fact the Michael Walzer holds a certain view within just war theory does not make it orthodox yet; and Walzer himself has made clear from the start that his thesis is not the traditional one.​[3]​ In order to see this, one only has to actually consult the texts of traditional just war theorists and pay attention to what they are explicitly saying.​[4]​
However, that a view is the dominant one does not yet make it correct. In fact, the dominant view, that is, the moral inequality thesis, is far too undifferentiated and has little relevance for most modern wars. ​[5]​ After all, in many, if not most modern wars the combatants on the justified side participate, even if they abide by ius in bello restrictions, in the killing of innocent and non-threatening people or culpably contribute to their being killed. The military euphemism for this is “collateral damage”; I prefer the term “concomitant slaughter.” By participating in or culpably contributing to the killing of innocent and non-threatening people one violates (or “infringes”)​[6]​ the rights of these people, and someone who does that cannot be just. Thus, the soldiers are at best justified, but that does not make them innocent in the relevant sense (namely in the sense of not wronging others). They remain liable to attack.
Jeff McMahan has countered this critique of the traditional view by claiming that justification defeats liability, and by arguing that therefore justified soldiers cannot be liable to attack. However, even if justification did defeat liability,​[7]​ this argument of McMahan’s would amount to question-begging as far as the moral inequality of combatants is concerned, for the argument derives the inequality of combatants only via the further premise that combatants on the unjustified (collective) side cannot, individually, justifiably participate in the war. However, that is not only far from obvious – individual participation in an unjustified collective act can clearly very often be justified – but it is also precisely the issue in dispute.
Thus, even if justification defeated liability, this would not be sufficient to undermine the thesis of the moral equality of combatants. And what is more (and this is the focus of the present article), McMahan’s own example of a symmetrical defense case, namely his tactical bomber example, opens the door wide open for soldiers to defend their fellow-citizens (on the grounds of their special obligations towards them and their family and friends) even if as part of this defense they target non-liable soldiers. So the soldiers on both sides would be permitted to kill each other (section 1). But if this is so, then given how McMahan defines “justification,” they would also be justified in killing the enemy soldiers and thus themselves not be liable. Thus we again arrive at a moral equality of combatants (section 2). Finally, his own account of liability cannot actually deal adequately with symmetrical defense cases in the first place. This undermines also the first premise of his argument, namely that justification defeats liability (section 3).


1 The permission to defend innocent civilians extends beyond these civilians to the combatants on their side 

Even if, as McMahan claims, justification defeated liability and justified combatants who threaten innocent bystanders were therefore not liable to attack, McMahan’s account of self-defense would still make room for the equality of combatants, this time in the sense of an equal permission to kill each other. This can be shown by McMahan’s own tactical bomber example:
A tactical bomber fighting in a just war has been ordered to bomb a military facility located on the border of the enemy country. He knows that if he bombs the factory, the explosion will kill innocent civilians living just across the border in a neutral country. But this would be a side effect of his action and would be proportionate to the contribution that the destruction of the facility would make to the achievement of the just cause. As he approaches, the civilians learn of his mission. They cannot flee in time but they have access to an anti-aircraft gun.​[8]​
And he later explains:
Because the tactical bomber’s justified action would wrong the civilians, they are permitted a proportionate defense. And killing him would be proportionate. But because he is not morally liable to be killed by them, they will wrong him if they kill him in self-defense. He too, therefore, is permitted a proportionate defense against their permissible defensive action. He is justified in killing them in preemptive self-defense.
He adds: “This reasoning is also compatible with the plausible view that third parties are not, other things being equal, permitted to intervene.”​[9]​
Against this it can be argued, first, that soldiers stand in a special relationship to the citizens they try to defend, and second, that innocents are innocents, whether they live across the border or not. Therefore, combatants on the unjustified side would have a liberty-right to attack combatants on the justified side in order to defend their own innocent civilians from the enemy combatants, even if those enemy combatants were not liable to attack.​[10]​
McMahan’s reply is that the “relation of being a citizen of the same state is, like being a member of the same race, not sufficiently significant to justify a third party’s killing a morally justified attacker in defense of his compatriot in a symmetrical defense case.”​[11]​
However, the collective act of waging the justified war threatens all people on the enemy side – hence also the family and friends of the soldiers on the unjustified side. The whole collective act wrongs those family and friends; and the individual soldier wrongs those family and friends by participating in this act, whether he personally threatens those family and friends or not. (In the complicity law of most Western jurisdictions, it does not even matter whether somebody who participated in or contributed to a crime causally contributed to it. This, I submit, is also plausible if we are not talking about unjustified actions but about “merely” unjust ones.)
In addition, there is the possibility that soldiers might be under a special obligation to defend their citizens.​[12]​ McMahan interprets this as some kind of contractual obligation and then likens this to the obligation of bodyguards towards their employers. Yet he takes issue with this analogy, observing that “while the bodyguard’s sole aim in killing the neutral person is to save the life of his innocent employer, the aims that guide the action of unjust combatants are typically more complex.”​[13]​ This is correct, but it is also irrelevant. First, the aims that guide the “just” soldiers will “typically” also be “more complex.” There is no reason to assume that “just” soldiers are simple-minded saints while “unjust” soldiers are super-complex villains. Which individual soldier is guided by what intentions is an entirely empirical question. Second, what individual intentions the different soldiers on the different sides have is also irrelevant to the question of whether they have an equal liberty-right to kill. When a soldier, whether on the justified side or not, can kill an enemy soldier in a situation where this is proportionate and saves the lives of people to whom the soldier has special responsibilities, then he normally has the liberty-right to do so. If he actually kills the enemy soldier out of base motives, perhaps because he does not like the other’s skin color, then this concrete act of killing might be blameworthy and unjustified. Yet this does not change the fact that the soldier (whether on the justified or on the unjustified side) had no duty toward the enemy soldier not to kill him. He was at best under a duty not to kill him for racist reasons. This duty, however, would exist on both sides.
McMahan also points out that the killing of “just” combatants by the unjust ones will result not only in the protection of their own civilians, but also in “the killing of innocent civilians on the other side and the advancement or promotion of their side’s unjust war aims.”​[14]​ However, I had already dealt with this point. To repeat (using a slightly different example), if my killing Bob in just self-defense will have the further effect (and I know about it) that Bob cannot be a witness against Al Capone and Al Capone will therefore continue to kill innocent people with impunity, this does not undermine the proportionality of my self-defense. I am not obliged to sacrifice myself or others for the lives of a larger number of people. In self-defense or the defense of others, proportionality simply is not a utilitarian or consequentialist calculus.​[15]​ Similarly, it is intuitively implausible to assume that, in defending one’s own against unjust attackers, one has to avoid all harm to and killing of innocent bystanders on the other side (in that case, McMahan would have to tell this also to the “just” combatants).
Besides, it should also be noted that McMahan’s reply cuts both ways: killing combatants on the unjustified side will have the effect not only of protecting civilians on the justified side, but also of endangering innocent civilians on the unjustified side and will thus advance and promote an unjust cause – after all, endangering innocent civilians certainly is an unjust cause.​[16]​ The fact of the matter is that contrary to McMahan’s implicit assumption, both justified and unjustified wars simultaneously promote both just and unjust causes. 
At this point McMahan now might want to rely on the following argument:
… if we include just combatants among the innocent and assume that military operations by unjust combatants in general kill at least as many innocent civilians as a side effect as military operations by just combatants … , it follows that acts of war by unjust combatants rarely save more innocent people than they kill. If, moreover, we accept the claim of common sense morality that one’s moral reason not to kill an innocent person is in general stronger than one’s moral reason not to allow an innocent person to be killed, then acts of war by unjust combatants are not permissible even if the number of innocent people they would save is comparable to, or even somewhat greater than, the number they would kill.​[17]​
First, I see no reason to include people who knowingly kill innocent bystanders among the innocents themselves. They wrong those innocent bystanders by killing them or mutilating them, and thus they incur guilt. Having justification is not always the same as being innocent.​[18]​
Second, the common sense claim he mentions might be correct “in general,” but there is also the common sense claim that allowing someone else to shoot your child is not much better (if any better) than doing it yourself. As argued above, McMahan has not succeeded in refuting the claim that soldiers defend people to whom they have special responsibilities – like their family, friends, neighbors, and, perhaps, their fellow citizens generally.
Third, McMahan now seems to have actually given up his attempt to block the expansion of the civilians’ permission to kill the bombers to the soldiers protecting the civilians, perhaps in light of considerations such as those in the previous paragraphs: 
… it’s hard to hold that line. If the civilians have a right of self-defense, it’s hard to believe that those they’ve paid to protect them aren’t permitted to help them do what they’re permitted to do.​[19]​
Indeed, that is hard to believe. Thus, now McMahan’s last line of defense is to deny even the civilians’ liberty-right to defend themselves against the bomber. In other words, McMahan relies on his new interpretation of the tactical bomber example. That new interpretation, however, is untenable, as we will see below in section (3).
Fourth, even if it were tenable in the specific example McMahan produces, this would still not help. For that example describes the situation such that ex hypothesi the number of the civilians that will be killed is the same as the number of crew, and, moreover, such that the bombers save innocent (or non-liable) people besides themselves by blowing up the factory, while the civilians being bombed would not save innocent people besides themselves by shooting down the bomber. Unfortunately, that example has nothing to do with the realities of war, which are much better represented by this example:
A tactical bomber fighting in a justified war has been ordered to bomb a military facility. He knows that if he bombs it, the explosion will kill innocent civilians on the enemy side. But this would be a side effect of his action and would be proportionate to the contribution that the destruction of the facility would make to the achievement of the just cause, namely the saving of certain innocents to whom he and his crew have special obligations. Thus, he has a necessity justification to kill those non-liable civilians. As he approaches, the civilians (who have access to an anti-aircraft gun) realize that not only they will be killed if the bombers blow up the factory, but that if the bomber crew gets away, it will kill so many more innocent civilians on their (the civilians’) side that the total number of civilians killed by the bomber crew will considerably exceed the number of the crew itself. This fact is also realized by combatants on the enemy side who try to stop the bomber. Thus, the civilians and the combatants on the unjustified side have a necessity justification to kill the non-liable bomber crew.
This example corresponds perfectly to the realities of war. After all, in modern wars more civilians than soldiers are killed (and this fact is not sufficient in itself to make a war disproportionate).
One might be tempted to advance four objections against this. First, if by shooting down the bomber crew the civilians on the enemy side will allow more innocent civilians on the other or on a third side (in the case of certain kinds of humanitarian intervention) to be killed, then this will make their self-defensive action disproportionate. However, I have already dealt with this objection above​[20]​ and have pointed out that McMahan now admits that it is not correct.
The second objection one might raise is that there is a difference between the action of the bombers and the action of the civilians: while the former would kill the civilians as a side-effect of the bombing of the military factory, the latter would intentionally kill the bombers. The reply to this objection is that, yes, there is an empirical difference – but it is of no moral importance. The objection relies on the doctrine of double effect, but that doctrine is mistaken and McMahan has certainly failed to show otherwise.​[21]​
According to the third objection and McMahan’s new stance on the tactical bomber example, “the reason the civilian’s action would be wrong is that it would be the intentional killing of a Justified Threat … without a necessity justification. There is no necessity or lesser evil justification if their act would result in many more innocent people being killed than would be killed if they didn’t act.”​[22]​ However, lesser evil and necessity justifications are simply not the same (although in practice they always get conflated). If mother A can only save her three children by stealing Bill’s boat from his property at 2:50 PM and rushing out to the lake and mother B can save her eleven children only by stealing Bill’s boat from his property at 3:00 PM, then mother A’s stealing the boat at 2:50 will not be the lesser evil (since it prevents mother B from saving her greater number of children), but mother A certainly would still have a necessity justification. And if mother A’s shooting down the tactical bomber will save her two children but as a side-effect doom the eleven children of mother B, she would still have a necessity justification to do so. That, at least, seems intuitively quite plausible, and McMahan has certainly not provided any argument to show that it is wrong.
Besides, epistemological considerations also play a role here. McMahan claims in another context:
If acting on the presumption that all unjust combatants are Partially Excused Threats, a just combatant inflicts a harm on an unjust combatant that would be proportionate if the latter were a Partially Excused Threat, the objective disproportionality would be indiscernible by anyone other than an omniscient observer, of which there are none.​[23]​
If this is true, we should note that for the civilians it is normally much more certain that some of them will be killed by the tactical bomber’s attack than it is that his attack will save anybody. After all, if the tactical bomber doesn't bomb the factory, another bomber might do so later, or there might be an act of sabotage, or the ammunition might be destroyed on its way to the front, and even if it isn’t, who is to say that this ammunition from this factory will actually kill anybody? But then it seems that the civilians are not required to assume that the bomber crew actually does have a necessity justification. They, however, would at the very least still have a subjective necessity justification.
According to the fourth objection,​[24]​ the combatants on the unjustified side are not permitted to defend their compatriots because the need for defense arises from their own (the unjustified combatants’) impermissible action. They have “provoked” the just combatants, as it were. Thus, if they want to save their compatriots, they should simply stop fighting. In reply, while the first aggressing soldiers have acted impermissibly, it is simply question-begging to claim that their comrades who later join the fray act impermissibly, too. One must not tar all combatants on the unjustified side with the same brush (especially if one propagates an individualist ethics of war). There are different unjustified soldiers, not an amorphous mass called “the unjust combatants.” Therefore, an individual combatant joining the fray later can also not reasonably be said to have “provoked” the justified war (he can, however, reasonably say to have been provoked by the “just” soldiers’ killing innocent people on the unjustified side). Second, there might not even be a first aggressing, “provoking” soldier on the unjustified side at all: the “just” soldiers might engage in a humanitarian intervention against certain irregular troops or a secret service committing a genocide. The regular army has nothing to do with it. Now the interveners come, producing collateral damage. And now the regular army defends them. Again, it is simply wrong to claim the “unjust soldiers” have provoked anything. The “just” soldiers have provoked the “unjust” ones. Third, it is not true that you cannot permissibly kill somebody you have provoked (it is neither true in law nor in morality), especially not if the “provoked” person reacts in such a way that she endangers the lives of innocents. 
Moreover, as I have already pointed out years ago,​[25]​ one must not ignore collective action problems: even if it were true that “the” combatants on the unjustified side could stop the war and save their innocents by simply surrendering (and it is at the very least not true for ongoing bombing attacks), an individual combatant cannot stop the war, or even as much as an ongoing attack, and save his innocents by simply surrendering. Only because he does it does not mean that all the others will do it, too. Under this circumstances his best option to personally save innocents on his side will often be to fight on.
Thus, McMahan’s fails to undermine the argument that even without an equal liberty-right of “just” and “unjust” combatants to kill each other they might still have an equal permission to kill each other.


2 If justification defeats liability, then this also holds in the case of justified combatants participating in an unjustified war

In arguing against the claim that his own treatment of the tactical bomber case entails that just combatants can be liable to defensive attack by virtue of posing a threat of wrongful harm to innocent people, even if the action by which they do so is morally justified, McMahan seems to constantly beg the question. Indeed, he himself admits that his argument might appear to do so.​[26]​ Immediately after the second such admission, however, he says that
the substantive point is this: given that self-defense is a matter of justice in the ex ante distribution of unavoidable harm, and given that just combatants who pose a threat of wrongful harm have positive moral justification for their action, there is no reason why justice would demand that unavoidable harm be distributed to them, for acting out of respect for morality, rather than to innocent bystanders. In a conflict between those who act at the behest of morality and those who are wholly innocent and act in self-preservation [actually, they act in self-defense], justice is silent.​[27]​
I have a couple of observations to make. First of all, I do not think that self-defense is only a matter of justice in the ex ante distribution of unavoidable harm. But let us leave this point aside here. Secondly and more importantly, combatants on the justified side do not necessarily act “at the behest of morality” or “out of respect for morality.” McMahan is painting an unduly rosy picture here. In the original paper that I criticized (and elsewhere), on the other hand, by “just combatants” he simply means “combatants who fight in a just war.”​[28]​ Obviously, however, such combatants can fight in the just war for all kinds of reasons, including utterly reprehensible ones. Seeing that McMahan does not want to give up the idea that intention makes a difference to the permissibility of an act (nor do I), it would be difficult for him to argue that the acts of just combatants are justified as long as they happen in a just war. After all, the just combatants might lack the right intention, and actually be intending to promote unjust goals. It seems that in that case they would not be justified in their killing of innocents, and hence there would be nothing to defeat their liability.
Third, McMahan begs the question again by simply assuming that the unjust combatants do not have a positive moral justification for their actions. Such a “positive justification,” explains McMahan, is different from mere permissibility – it includes permissibility and “a significant moral reason” to perform the action.​[29]​ Yet, trying to defend the innocent on one’s own side, including one’s relatives and friends, certainly is a significant moral reason to engage in combat. To be sure, not all unjust combatants will actually fight because they want to contribute to the protection of their innocents. On the other hand, as already noted, the just combatants will also not all be fighting because they want to contribute to the just cause. If they fight with the intention to promote unjust goals they will be unjustified. Thus, we have again arrived at an equality of combatants: if justification defeats liability, then, since “unjust” combatants are permitted to defend the innocent civilians on their side (section 1) and the goal of saving them would give the combatants “positive” justification, both the “unjust” and the “just” combatants are not liable to attack. 


3 The tactical bomber: old and new

On my account the tactical bomber example is not an example of a symmetrical defense case. In my view, the tactical bomber is liable to attack by the civilians but not vice versa. However, I think that there are symmetrical defense cases. Take Nozick’s example of an innocent falling man who threatens to crush a person below. This person can only save himself by using his ray gun, vaporizing the falling man. In my view, he is justified in doing so, but the falling man is also justified in drawing his own ray gun and trying to defend himself against the defensive attack of the man below. 
The reason for this is that on my account of self-defense and liability people have a right to defend themselves against unjust threats of all sorts (an unjust threat being one that does not have a right to pose the threat and has not been set in motion by someone who had a right to do so).​[30]​ Thus, this right refers not only to threats posed by persons, but to all threats, including to those posed by inanimate objects. That there is such a right is shown, for example, by the injustice of a law that prohibits destroying a rock that threatens to crush me.​[31]​
Whereas a rock does not have any rights, the falling man has. He has a right to life and a right to self-defense. He has, however, no right to crush the man below, and therefore he poses an unjust threat. Now, if the rights of the two persons are not compatible in this situation – that is, if the innocent person below can only defend himself and save his life by vaporizing the unjust threat above with his ray gun – then, on this account – the (claim-)rights in their collision can no longer be upheld as (claim-)rights (for as claim-rights they are not compatible) but instead become mere liberties (liberty-rights).​[32]​ While a right, understood as a claim right, implies that the person I hold the right against cannot interfere in my exercise of it without wronging me, a liberty(-right) held against a certain person only implies that I am not duty-bound towards that person not to exercise this liberty and thus implies that by exercising it I would not wrong her.​[33]​ It does not imply that the other person would wrong me if she tried to keep me from exercising my liberty. Thus, on my account, in this case both parties have lost their claim-rights to life and to self-defense but retained their liberty-rights to life and self-defense.
Thus, my account does not have any problems with symmetrical defense cases. Symmetrical liability is the solution. This is a solution McMahan lacks, in part due to his creed that justification defeats liability. And therefore his account cannot handle these problems in an intuitively plausible and philosophically coherent way.
Let us have a closer look at this. McMahan’s prime example of a symmetrical defense case has always been his “tactical bomber”-example. Recently, however, he has also dramatically changed his views about this example (such that his new views, in my opinion, are even more counter-intuitive than his old ones). He now denies what he once took to be undeniable, namely that the innocent civilians in that example may defend themselves against the justified tactical bomber who is about to foreseeably (although not intentionally) kill them (if the numbers of the bombers and civilians are equal).​[34]​
I suspect (although I cannot be sure) that McMahan has two motivations for changing his account of the tactical bomber example. One might be to block the attempt (see section 1) to expand the civilians' permission to defend themselves against the bomber to their fellow-citizens, including to those who are combatants. If this attempt were successful, after all, we would again arrive at a mutual permission of combatants on both the justified and the unjustified side to kill each other even if it were true that justification defeats liability. I will return to this point later.
The other motivation might be precisely to escape the objection that his account cannot deal with symmetrical defense cases.​[35]​ However, the fact of the matter is that it is not possible to escape the objection by simply reinterpreting the tactical bomber example. After all, all that is needed for the objection to succeed is that there are symmetrical defense cases – whether or not the tactical bomber case is one of them is irrelevant. Thus, I will first analyze McMahan’s published views on the tactical bomber case, then present his new view and show that McMahan’s new interpretation of the tactical bomber case is untenable, and finally develop an example that counts as a symmetrical defense case even if the original tactical bomber example no longer does (and which, therefore, can serve as the basis of my objections against McMahan’s view on symmetrical defense even if the tactical bomber example could not). 
McMahan thinks that the tactical bomber and the civilians wrong each other. (I think that in the tactical bomber case the bomber wrongs the civilians, but not the other way around.) But what does that mean? If A wrongs B, then, all else being equal, A owes B (or perhaps his relatives) compensation. Thus, I say that in the case McMahan describes the tactical bomber would owe compensation to the civilians, but not the other way round.​[36]​ McMahan simply states that his intuitions about compensation are different from mine.​[37]​ That is fine, and the readers have to decide for themselves what their intuitions here are. However, it seems that McMahan cannot say that the wrongs done by the tactical bomber and by the civilians do not call for any compensation, for how then could they be wrongs? It is, on the face of it, contradictory to say, “Yes, I wronged you, but I owe you absolutely nothing for that.”
To be sure, there might be exceptions. For example, suppose that A steals 100 dollars from B’s house, while simultaneously B steals the same amount from A’s house. I think they wronged each other, but they do not owe to the other any compensation. They already have the compensation, as it were. But now consider this case: An untouchable super-villain honestly and credibly threatens the wealthy Smith with killing thousands of innocent people unless Smith tries his best to find the wealthy Jones and to knock him out. Smith finds Jones, justifiably attacks him from behind, and Jones defends himself and breaks Smith’s nose. Does Jones owe Smith compensation? Legally, clearly not; nor morally, of course. McMahan might again just say that he does not share my intuition, but given the legal situation, it is quite safe to assume that he will not find too many people sharing his intuition.
Moreover, what if Smith and Jones broke each other’s noses simultaneously? Do they then owe each other compensation? Obviously not. It makes no sense to say that Smith owes Jones, let’s say, 1000 dollars while simultaneously Jones owes Smith 1000 dollars. But if they do not owe each other compensation, what does it mean to say that they have wronged each other in this case, which is very different from the theft case? Exactly the same question arises in the context of McMahan’s tactical bomber example. 
Note, further, that McMahan needs the premise that “there is no right of defense against an attack to which one is liable” in order to distinguish his position that just combatants “are not liable to attack by anyone, even the innocent civilians they threaten”​[38]​ from the position that they are liable to attack by the civilians, but not by the enemy soldiers.​[39]​ And an acceptance of this premise would force me, given my position, into certain counter-intuitive implications that McMahan, given his position, could avoid. However, there is no reason to accept that premise – McMahan certainly does not adduce any, and only makes the clearly mistaken statement that “there can be no justified defense against harms to which one is morally liable, just as there can be no justified defense against harms that one deserves.”​[40]​ Here are two examples showing that the statement is mistaken: If I deserve to go to prison for a week, but know that in that case a super-villain will destroy Earth, I am clearly justified in resisting arrest. If I am unjustly hitting B, and B can only stop me by knocking me out, but I suddenly hear the super villain credibly telling me through my earphones that he will destroy Earth if I do not defend myself against B’s defense, then I am justified to defend myself against B’s attack, although I am liable to it – B would not wrong me by attacking me.​[41]​ Thus, the distinction between the two positions remains spurious.
Finally, it remains mysterious why in McMahan’s account the civilians may defend themselves against the tactical bomber. To be sure, he gives an explicit reason, but the question is why that is supposed to be a reason:
… the self-defensive killing of a Justified Attacker (such as the Tactical Bomber) is supported by appeal to the fact that his action threatens to harm someone in a way that would wrong her …​[42]​
This is simply a special case of his general principle that “people are permitted a necessary and proportionate defense of their rights against both violation and infringement.”​[43]​
However, he says about Feinberg’s hiker, who breaks into someone’s cabin to avoid freezing to death in a snowstorm, that he “infringes the owner’s right and owes the owner compensation, but the owner would have no moral right of defense against the trespass.”​[44]​ This is of course not a contradiction. The reason is that the owner’s furniture is not as valuable as the hiker’s life, but preventing the hiker’s trespass would ex hypothesi cost the hiker his life, and therefore defense against the trespass would be disproportionate. On the other hand, if the hiker could only survive by killing and eating the owner and attempts to do so, he would – and McMahan would certainly agree (penal law does) – become liable to attack. Why? Because “infringing”​[45]​ someone’s right is only permissible if something far more important is at stake. Rights are trumps. It is not justified to kill one innocent person​[46]​ who has a right to life (though innocent people posing a threat to someone who is not responsible for initiating a threat to another innocent and non-threatening person do not have a right to life) to save just yourself; it is at best justified as a lesser evil or a necessity – to kill one innocent person who has a right to life to save many. McMahan is well aware of this lesser evil or necessity justification:
It is commonly recognized … that it can in principle be permissible intentionally to harm or kill an innocent person if that is necessary to avert some great disaster. The necessity of preventing the disaster outweighs the grave injustice done to the individual victim.​[47]​
Indeed, this is commonly recognized, and this justification can be used by the tactical bomber, who ex hypothesi kills some innocent bystanders to save many (and does not even do so intentionally, but only as a foreseen side-effect of his attack on a military target). However, it is not at all commonly recognized that in order to save one life only, namely one’s own, one may “infringe” upon the right to life of an innocent person by intentionally killing that person!​[48]​ That this is entirely acceptable, however, is precisely what McMahan claims when he states on behalf of the civilian that “the self-defensive killing of a Justified Attacker (such as the Tactical Bomber) is supported by appeal to the fact that his action threatens to harm someone in a way that would wrong her.” To merely offer as “justification” for this claim the statement that “people are permitted a necessary and proportionate defense of their rights against both violation and infringement” is, in the words McMahan once used to criticize Judith Jarvis Thomson, “an ingenious exercise in begging the question.”​[49]​ It is also, and more importantly, implausible.​[50]​
As already noted, this problem cannot be solved by reinterpreting the tactical bomber example in the way McMahan did recently. While he once thought, as we have just seen, that none of the two parties are liable to attack but that they are nevertheless permitted to attack each other (although the intuitively more natural interpretation certainly is that only the civilians are not liable, while the bomber is), he now claims that both parties are still not liable, but that only the bombers are permitted to attack the civilians while the civilians are not permitted to defend themselves​[51]​
 In my view, this is a step from counter-intuitive to extremely counter-intuitive – especially when we notice that on McMahan’s view the civilians would not even be allowed to save their lives from the attack if they could do so by killing the bombers without thwarting the mission (he gives the example of them deflecting the deadly debris from the destroyed ammunitions factory in the direction of the bomber when they cannot deflect it in any other direction). In other words, the necessity justification of the bomber not only defeats liability, it now defeats even “permissible attackability”!
On this logic, of course, a group of civilians as large as in the tactical bomber example would not be allowed to defend themselves against a person who is trying to get their organs in order to save as many people by transplantation as the tactical bomber saves by bombing the factory. They would have to sacrifice themselves for the greater good (and “sacrifice” is the right word for desisting from self-defense in such situations and in the bomber example, as McMahan knows very well​[52]​). Maybe McMahan would be willing to bite this bullet.​[53]​ Very few, however, would follow him.
McMahan might, however, object that the two cases (“tactical bomber” and “organ distributor”) are not relevantly similar, because in the latter case the civilians are used as means while in the former case their death is only a side-effect. (Although, if they defend themselves, killing them and thus preventing the success of their defense would be a means to achieve the mission.) The problem with this objection, though, is that it relies on the doctrine of double effect. That doctrine, however, has been reduced to a minority position (as McMahan also knows​[54]​), and for good reason.
Of course, McMahan will deny that there are good reasons, and in fact he has recently defended the doctrine of double effect (DDE).​[55]​ Yet, it has to be said that his defense misses the point of most criticisms of this doctrine (particularly the most compelling ones). To wit, McMahan is laboring under the assumption that critics of the DDE must accept the doctrine of the “irrelevance of intention to permissibility.”​[56]​ Some critics of the DDE do, for example Judith Jarvis Thomson, one of McMahan’s main targets in this context. However, I have also criticized Thomson and emphasized, like McMahan does, that contrary to her views it does make a difference to the permissibility of Albert’s intentional bodily movements whether he engages in them with the intention of killing his wife or saving her.​[57]​ What I and other critics deny, however, is that it makes a difference whether Albert gives his wife a deadly drug intending her death or whether he gives her the drug foreseeing and knowing that this will kill her.​[58]​ Thus the critics deny – in accord with most jurisdictions in the Western world and with common sense – that it does matter whether one intends certain consequences or merely foresees them. In both cases – in the case where Albert gives his innocent wife the drug with the intention to win a bet (“You won’t dare to give it to her”) not caring whether, but foreseeing that, his innocent wife will die consequently, and in the case where he gives his innocent wife the drug with the intention to kill here and not caring whether, but foreseeing that, he thereby wins the bet – he is a murderer. Thus, the critics do not claim that intentions do not matter; they only claim that the difference between intentionally and knowingly bringing about a bad consequence does not matter. Nothing in McMahan’s defense of the DDE comes even close to undermining this claim; indeed, he ignores the countless counter-examples that have been provided against this claim of the DDE (which, for that matter, also undermine the moral relevance of the distinction between “eliminative” and “opportunistic agency”). Thus, McMahan cannot rely on this doctrine. And so the enormously counter-intuitive implications concerning our pacifist obligations towards utilitarian organ thieves cannot be credibly blocked.
Finally, let me revise the tactical bomber example such that, even if one shares McMahan’s new interpretation of the example, it is once more a symmetrical defense case (that is, a case McMahan’s account of liability would have to deal with but cannot handle, while mine can). The revised version goes like this: 
A tactical bomber fighting in a justified war has been ordered to bomb a military facility located on the border of the enemy country. He knows that if he bombs the factory, the explosion will kill innocent civilians living just across the border in a neutral country. But this would be a side effect of his action and would be proportionate to the contribution that the destruction of the facility would make to the achievement of the just cause, namely the saving of certain innocents for whom he and his crew have a special responsibility. As he approaches, the civilians (who have access to an anti-aircraft gun) are credibly and accurately warned by the president of their country that the drone accompanying the bomber has been compromised by a computer virus and will soon go astray, killing many innocent people. The civilians know that the explosion of the drone will kill the justified bomber and his justified crew (the numbers of civilians and of the crew are the same), but this would be a side effect of their action and would be proportionate to the contribution that the destruction of the drone would make to the achievement of the just cause of saving innocent civilians for whom they have a special responsibility.
Here the two parties are in an exactly symmetrical situation. One possibility would be to deny that they may defend themselves against each other. But that seems to be absurd (not only intuitively, but also given the stipulations about proportionality, which do perfectly cohere with each other). So the only possibility left is to grant them the permission of symmetrical self-defense. McMahan’s account of liability, however, for reasons already adduced above, cannot explain where that permission is supposed to come from.
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